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The late John Wilson has long been a champion of education as a human undertaking with an integ-
rity of its own, as distinct from one that is essentially subordinate to extrinsic interests and influences
(e.g. religious, political, commercial). He has also been a fearless critic of forms of thinking that he
regarded as failing to articulate adequately that integrity. In keeping with this view he has boldly
argued that the philosophy of education must be conceived and practised as a sui generis activity.
In this memorial essay I am keen to show that Wilson is right, and crucially so, in arguing that
education is a field of action in its own right and in maintaining that the philosophy of education is
a sui generis activity. I am also keen to illustrate however, that Wilson is wrong in decisive respects
in how he conceives of the sui generis character of the philosophy of education and in the restricted
understanding of education as a practice that flows from this conception. Acknowledging a debt to
Wilson’s writings, the essay seeks to pursue further some of his more incisive insights and to connect
these to some promising inspirations for educational thought and practice that have their origins in
the distinctive, but largely eclipsed work of the historical figure Socrates. To argue thus is to high-
light the radical nature of the claim that educational thought and action constitute a sui generis
undertaking and to call into question any claim that philosophy of education is ‘a branch of’ one or
other form of academic philosophy.
Introduction
For more than three decades before his death in 2003, John Wilson was a ceaseless
advocate of education as a coherent enterprise in its own right or, more concisely, of
the integrity of education as a human undertaking. He was also a fearless critic of
anything he viewed as compromising that integrity, whether springing from the
actions of policymakers on the one hand or from unacknowledged incoherencies
within the philosophy of education on the other. Wilson held a firm and abiding
conviction that if education as a field of study could be distinguished by clear-sighted
and authoritative forms of thinking, unambiguously centred on questions of teaching
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and learning, education as a practice could proceed in happier circumstances. It
would thus be better equipped, he maintained, to pursue its own goals robustly in the
face of the designs of those in positions of power (political, economic, religious etc.)
who regarded education chiefly as a subordinate instrument for advancing their own
large-scale priorities.
Wilson’s criticisms, characteristically presented in the pages of this journal, tended
to focus more on the intellectual disarray he perceived among scholars in the field of
education than on flaws in the designs of educational policymakers. It is not that he
was unconscious of the latter; rather that he felt it of primary importance that philo-
sophical discourse on education should address the ‘quite scandalous’ confusion
besetting it and put its own house clearly in order (2003a, p. 282). But in the last two
decades the international tenor of educational reform has significantly strengthened
the influence of economic and social policy within the arenas of public education. By
the same token it has largely obscured anything like a voice that might claim for
education a sphere of liberty of its own, or an integrity of its own. The task of reclaim-
ing such a voice carries therefore as much practical urgency as scholarly importance,
as does the articulation of an almost forgotten idea that may now seem a little strange,
if not eccentric: namely that education as a human undertaking might actually possess
an integrity of its own. My purpose in this memorial is to review some of Wilson’s
decisive contributions to advancing such a task, though this will not amount to an
overall assessment of his work. The latter undertaking would be too large for an
article such as this and would have to deal with aspects of Wilson’s wider labours,
such as his writings on moral education for instance. My purpose has a more practical
character: to highlight some characteristic themes in Wilson’s work and to show that
an active and critical engagement with such themes would richly repay the efforts of
those for whom education is both an occupation and a field of study. At a time when
both the occupation and the field of study have endured much stormy weather, this
might well be the most appropriate memorial to a redoubtable champion of educa-
tion.
Education as a coherent enterprise in its own right
Wilson’s strong convictions about education as a form of action possessing an integ-
rity of its own, and accordingly about philosophy of education as a sui generis activity,
became clearly evident in his books of the 1970s like Educational theory and the prep-
aration of teachers (1975), Philosophy and practical education (1977) and Preface to the
philosophy of education (1979a). These convictions also underlay his many writings on
educational studies and his work as a founder editor in 1975, and later as General
Editor, of the Oxford Review of Education. Informing these convictions was a wary
insight, reminiscent of Michael Oakeshott’s criticisms some decades earlier, that
‘education is a natural stage for the dance of fashion and fantasy’ (Wilson, 1980,
pp. 47–48), and that a failure to take up arms against the consequences of this
allowed the field of educational studies to become beset by incoherence. Secondly,
Wilson’s determination to confront the dance of educational fashion took shape as a
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sense of mission to provide a more disciplined and a more promising environment for
educational thought and action. Towards the end of a 1980 essay in this journal, titled
‘Philosophy of Education: retrospect and prospect’, he voiced his concerns frankly: 
I see little hope for the future unless and until the staff of institutions concerned with the
study of education and the preparation of teachers themselves, individually and collec-
tively, display a good deal more interest in the rational and intellectual discussion of educa-
tional issues, and a good deal more anxiety to sophisticate the level of that discussion.
(1980, p. 51)
In the decades since the mid-1970s the distinctiveness of Wilson’s mission could be
discerned in two prominent features of his work. The first of these was his insistence
that serious thought about education as an undertaking must intentionally disavow
the popular fancies, intellectual fashions, subjective loyalties and ideological precon-
ceptions that habitually throng the public arenas of educational debate. The second
feature can be described as the constructive corollary of the first—namely that serious
thought about education must first and foremost be a strict and circumspect logical
discipline, informed by a facility for reasoned argument; argument that is as self-
critical as it is incisive.
Notwithstanding his declared mission, his prolific writings and his prominent
standing as a figure in the philosophy of education, it is significant that Wilson’s argu-
ments on education as a coherent enterprise in its own right did not give rise to what
in intellectual life is called ‘a school of thought’. In this his work differed from the
more influential currents of linguistic and conceptual analysis in the philosophy of
education; currents that became especially associated with the names of R. S. Peters
and P. H. Hirst and their many followers, especially from the late 1960s to the early
1980s. Though Wilson was sympathetic to the promise of clarity that philosophy as
conceptual analysis might bring to education, both as a field of study and a form of
action, he remained critical of what he saw as a failure of the bulk of such analysis to
make good that promise (Wilson, 2003b, p. 288; 2003a, p. 103). To honour such a
promise, Wilson persistently argued, ‘our first priority in the philosophy of education
is to determine what “education” means, along with its cognate terms (“educate”,
“educational”, etc.)’ (2003a, p. 104). On the face of it, this may seem to us to be more
a rudimentary task of consulting a dictionary than a probing philosophical one. But
Wilson is ever quick to remind his readers that very large quantities of educational
research literature, and even the philosophical work of ‘Peters and his associates’, fails
to achieve—though in varying degrees—the kind of clarity that is necessary here
(Wilson, 1975, Ch.1; 1979b, p. 21; 1980, pp. 43–44; 2003b, p. 288). That is to say,
conceptions of education that equate it with what currently goes on in schools, or with
the current priorities of a ministry of education, or with one’s preferred intellectual
leanings, are all too often taken as unproblematic by the research literature itself. In
his ‘retrospect and prospect’ essay Wilson criticised this tendency in the following
terms: 
the idea is that either the content of education or (worse) what is to count as education
must in the last resort depend on one’s ideology, ultimate values, or beliefs about what
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constitutes the good life. … Very few have treated education in its own right, or seen it as
much more than a means of implementing their preferred ideology. (1980, p. 43)
To the extent that it seems natural, or somehow inescapable, to think of education as
a vehicle for transmitting an ideology or a favoured set of beliefs, Wilson’s insistence
to the contrary may seem odd, or even obstinate. That he is aware of this is evident
from Wilson’s own characterisation of the alternative to ‘ideological’ conceptions of
education: ‘The alternative view, of which (for lack of others) I have to quote myself
as a defender, would be that “education” marks a certain kind of human enterprise,
perhaps inevitable for all societies, with its own logical limits, its own necessarily
connected concepts, and its own virtues and vices’ (1980, p. 43).
There is an acknowledgement here by Wilson that his is a lone voice, and the
acknowledgement might seem to offer confirmation that his stance is an eccentric one.
This impression might be strengthened moreover when one takes account of Wilson’s
declarations that the work of the educational philosopher who sticks conscientiously
to his trade can ‘include a certain dourness and puritanism’, or is likely to be ‘somewhat
monastic’ (1980, p. 48). Yet, when one stands back a bit to interrogate Wilson’s
acknowledgement more objectively, what is really a little strange about it is just this
conclusion that his is actually a lone voice. It may be a somewhat lone voice in the context
of contemporary scholarly discourse on education in the UK, or even amid the inherited
conventional wisdom about education in Western societies. But in essence, the voice
that Wilson articulates and defends here finds its locus classicus in the educational work
of Socrates of Athens. Critically viewed, the latter’s famous Apology (Plato, 1969)
stands as an eloquent and suggestive testament to the integrity of learning and teaching.
It is notable moreover that human learning, and the kinds of action that most worthily
advance it, reveal themselves here not mainly as a field of skills, or even as a profession.
More importantly, they become disclosed as active interplays that offer possibilities
for a distinctive way of life. I will return to the educational significance of this a little
later. For now, it is sufficient to emphasise that Wilson’s claim that education has an
integrity of its own, far from being a peculiarity of a lone philosophical voice in our
own time, finds its natural home in the singular, if largely neglected legacy of Socrates
to Western civilisation. Though he does not take the work of Socrates as a major theme
for exploration, most of Wilson’s publications on philosophy of education make one
or more illustrative references to Socrates.
Philosophy of Education as a sui generis pursuit
Historians of Western education have pointed out that, following the transition from
the ancient world to the Middle Ages, the Christian church (later churches) gained a
thousand-year monopoly of educational power. Historians also stress that one of the
lasting consequences of this was that the school became the ‘adjunct of the church’
(Boyd & King, 1966, p. 101). What is rarely highlighted in the historical accounts,
however, is that the waning of church power in education during the modern histor-
ical era was not accompanied by a decline of the hierarchical conceptions of education
on which this power was based. Thus it seems somehow to be in ‘the order of things’
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that, in a more secular age, education should become, not the author of its own
affairs, but the instrument of a different power, such as the state, or a political party,
or some prominent corporate interests in society. It is because of the apparent natu-
ralness of this inherited state of affairs that it may seem peculiar or counter-intuitive
to suggest, as Wilson invariably has done, that education is properly a field of human
action in its own right, with ‘its own logical limits, its own necessarily connected
concepts, and its own virtues and vices’ (Wilson, 1980, p. 43). I am keen to show that
Wilson is right, and crucially so, in arguing that education is a field of action in its
own right and in maintaining that the philosophy of education is a sui generis activity.
I am also keen to illustrate, however, that Wilson is wrong in decisive respects in how
he conceives of the sui generis character of the philosophy of education and in the
restricted understanding of education as a practice that flows from this. My criticisms
of Wilson’s arguments bear some parallels with those of Paul Standish in his compan-
ion article to my own (Standish, 2006).
Wilson has deployed many arguments in his writings over many years, in support
of his sui generis claim. His most recent and arguably his most forceful effort in this
connection is the 2003 essay referred to earlier ‘Perspectives on the Philosophy of
Education’ (2003b). Accordingly that essay will be the main focus of attention here.
Wilson begins the essay by providing a review of what he sees as the still-confused
state of affairs in the philosophy of education more than twenty years after his
‘retrospect and prospect’ article of 1980. Perusing an issue of the proceedings of the
Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain from the opening years of the 21st
century, Wilson observes wryly that now ‘more or less anything goes’ (2003b, p. 280).
He notes a bewildering variety of contributions, from ‘Foucauldian influences in the
turn to narrative therapy’ to ‘The Promise of Bildung’, to ‘Waiting on the Web’, to
‘Reconsideration of Rorty’s view of the liberal ironist as the post-modern ideal of the
educated’ (p. 280). Lamenting the lack in all of this of ‘a single perspective on the
philosophy of education’, or ‘a single genre of discourse’, Wilson’s conclusion is a
grim one. ‘An outsider, or even a fashion-conscious insider, will be baffled both by
the question of what the philosophy of education is supposed to be about, and by the
question of how it is supposed to deal with whatever it is supposed to be about’
(p. 280).
My own first response to Wilson’s ‘anything goes’ charge is to call attention to the
point that a similar diversity (though others, including Wilson, might say disparity) is
now to be found in much of the scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, and
indeed in Western philosophy itself as practised outside of the UK. Here are fields
currently marked as much by a ferment of novel intellectual energies as by any author-
itative influences received from Western intellectual tradition. And it is important to
stress that this new diversity, most often one or other genre of critique, be viewed
positively; for instance as the articulation of previously marginalised voices which
have now arrived to stay in the critical conversations of humankind. Remaining with
the philosophy of education, however, there is a core to Wilson’s criticism that cannot
easily be discarded. For example, suppose one was to be presented solely with the
texts of the articles included over the last decade or so in the half dozen international
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journals in this field (in the English language). Next, suppose one was asked, having
read them, to identify the field of study of each article, and to give an approximate
title for the journal in which it might have appeared. Though some journals would
fare better than others here, the task as a whole might yield as many puzzling as clear-
cut instances. In those less clear-cut instances, it is likely that terms like ‘culture
criticism’, ‘political theory’, ‘feminist ethics’, ‘applied philosophy’, would feature
quite frequently as the probable field of study. From an editorial exercise of this kind
it is difficult to deny some telling substance to Wilson’s charge that specifically educa-
tional concerns are too little in evidence in contemporary philosophy of education, or
his related charge that most of such philosophy has little to say to educational
practice.
Wilson then seeks a strategy that would successfully tackle his two-fold charge and
provide the philosophy of education with a context in which it might fruitfully
develop. His preliminary move is to identify four criteria, which I have paraphrased
as follows. The philosophy of education is to be an activity: (1) which can properly,
not misleadingly, be called such; (2) which is not already identified under some other
title; (3) which is a sui generis activity and therefore different in purpose and scope
from other disciplines; (4) which has something valuable to offer to those involved in
educational practice, including teachers, student teachers, educational researchers
and policy-makers (2003b, p. 281). He sketches four broadly-conceived forms of
philosophy and reviews each against the four criteria just outlined: (a) philosophy as
a personal creed, (b) philosophy as a discipline for value judgements, (c) philosophy
as an empirical discipline and (d) philosophy as a logical discipline. He then
concludes with some arguments on what the subject matter of philosophy of educa-
tion should properly deal with (pp. 289–293).
In his appraisal of the first of his four forms as a basis for the philosophy of educa-
tion—namely philosophy as a personal creed—Wilson acknowledges that most
educators have some personal ‘philosophy’ in this sense, and suggests that this is
probably inevitable; even desirable insofar as it gives a coherence to choices and
actions on the educator’s part that might otherwise be arbitrary. But he points out
that a personal creed cannot properly merit the name ‘philosophy of education’, as it
does not provide the resources for an objective critique of the substantive influences
(ideological or otherwise) that inform the creed in question. The necessity for such a
critical discipline brings him to discuss the second of his four forms, namely ‘philos-
ophy as a discipline for value judgements’. Here Wilson points out that ‘the criteria
of reason’ move to the fore in importance. He sees substantial merit in this second
form, in that philosophy as a critical discipline can ‘help us with our judgements of
values, not by handing us a set of values on a plate … but by showing us how to oper-
ate reasonably in this particular field’ (p. 284). I will argue a little later that Wilson’s
view of the ‘criteria of reason’ is an attenuated one and may be too optimistic, but he
is right in pointing out that even if philosophy as a critical discipline has supplied the
kind of help he expects of it in handling value judgements, this is not enough to
qualify this form of philosophy as a paradigm for the philosophy of education. This is
because value judgements encompass a far wider field than education—for instance,
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political, moral, aesthetic, religious values. And this very awareness raises a question
about the nature and scope of educational values themselves. Wilson now puts this
question in the form of an either/or: ‘Are there educational values in their own right,
perhaps enshrined in the concept of education itself? Or are educational values just a
mishmash of moral and political and other values, as these happen to crop up in the
practice of education?’ (p. 284). Consistent with his stance that education is a coher-
ent enterprise in its own right, he maintains that the first rather than the second
question must be answered in the affirmative if the philosophy of education is to be a
sui generis discipline. He points to some work of his own, most notably Preface to the
philosophy of education (1979a), in support of his affirmative answer and goes on to
claim that an enormous amount of further work needs to be done by philosophers of
education to strengthen the case for ‘educational values in their own right’, and thus
to strengthen the discipline itself. In my own view, Wilson’s call here (and elsewhere
in his writings) to fellow philosophers of education to concentrate their energies on
questions that are demonstrably and importantly educational ones, is both apt and
courageous. It remains a timely call and may yet prove to be a historic one. Much of
the ‘further work [that] needs to be done’ however involves critical investigation of
Wilson’s conclusions, and presuppositions, about ‘educational values in their own
right.’ Paul Standish’s companion article to my own in this issue provides some
incisive illustrations of such further work.
In his review of the third form of philosophy he has sketched—philosophy as an
empirical discipline—Wilson concludes that the kinds of truth to be disclosed by
empirical enquiry, especially in the humanities and social sciences (history, psychol-
ogy, sociology, anthropology) are of a different nature than those that concern philos-
ophy. Philosophical concerns, he continues, should not therefore become confused
with these empirical disciplines. He claims that it was partly a recognition of this point
that led to a development of the ‘conceptual analysis’ movement in philosophy from
the 1930s onwards, and in philosophy of education from the late 1960s. Acknowledg-
ing that ‘conceptual analysis’ has been widely criticised by more recent generations of
educational philosophers, Wilson adds the perceptive point that the most serious
charge to be made against philosophy as conceptual analysis, and particularly in the
field of education, is that ‘it does not really offer an escape from the empirical’
(p. 286). Truths about the rules for the use of a particular concept are, at the end of
the day explains Wilson, empirical truths. For instance, the most such a ‘conceptual’
enquiry can legitimately offer in relation to the concept marked by the word
‘education’, is information on how this word is used in contemporary English—as
distinct from something more certain (p. 286). This he concludes, does not
sufficiently distinguish philosophy of education from enquiries that are essentially
empirical in character and thus fails to identify it as a sui generis discipline. Noting that
something more radical is called for, Wilson now moves to examine the fourth form
in his sketch, namely philosophy as a logical discipline.
The main point of merit that recommends the philosophy of education as a logical
discipline, Wilson argues, is that it seeks to establish with clarity ‘logical distinctions
that are time-free and culture-free, and hence not in the normal sense of the word
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empirical’ (p. 288). Important examples he mentions are the distinction between
education and training and between education and indoctrination. He stresses more-
over that what is being established in such instances is not a point about contempo-
rary usage of language, but important distinctions that exist in their own right and
that have decisive practical consequences. Less obvious, but no less important exam-
ples are to be found, he continues, in the everyday conduct of education, such as the
distinction between a ‘well-disciplined’ class and a class that is kept under control by
terror, or charm, or other dubious means. He suggests further that the field of educa-
tion, far from needing just a few major distinctions of this kind, supplies an embar-
rassment of riches for such logical work. Here he brings together his second form of
philosophy with his fourth, since the ‘logic of value judgements’ includes in its subject
matter the making of ‘distinctions that seem peculiarly relevant to education’
(p. 289). This confluence of ‘a discipline for value judgements’ and ‘a logical disci-
pline’ offers the most promising prospects, Wilson claims, for the form that the
philosophy of education should take. He points out that it meets the four criteria he
outlined, including the important final one—the question of its practical value to
educators. In case his readers have difficulty in seeing this last point, Wilson makes it
explicit with the following examples. 
How a teacher conceives of ‘discipline’ will profoundly affect what he aims to achieve in
the classroom, and what the educational researcher takes to be the subject of his research
under that title. What we decide to mean by (for instance) ‘spirituality’, or ‘citizenship’, or
‘moral education’ will govern what we actually do under these headings. The way in which
we classify pupils as having ‘special needs’, or a ‘disability’, or ‘learning difficulties’, will in
itself single out certain types of pupils for certain kinds of treatment. (p. 289)
Having highlighted something of the substance and significance of Wilson’s main
criticisms of the philosophy of education, and having elucidated in summary his
constructive proposals for fruitful work in the discipline in the future, I want to turn
now to engage more critically with these proposals.
The practical character of philosophy of education
Wilson has repeatedly stressed his view that education is not a ‘contestable’ concept.
In other words he has insisted that its meaning is not to be essentially linked to the
perspectives of different cultures or different historical eras. Acknowledging the
empirical fact that there might be important differences in what different cultures
might understand by ‘a happy marriage’ or by ‘democracy’ or by ‘education’ Wilson
nevertheless insists that such different conceptions do not displace—because they do
not reach—the heart of the particular concept in question. Accordingly, his own
‘culture-free and time-free’ definition of the concept of education goes as follows: ‘a
process of serious and sustained learning for the benefit of people as such [as
humans], above the level of what they might naturally pick up for themselves’
(p. 290). Wilson seeks to provide here a definition that is not open to the charge that
education is a ‘contestable’ concept. Critics might point out here that the notion of a
‘culture-free’ understanding of anything raises issues that are more problematic and
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contestable than Wilson acknowledges; a point that I will return to directly below.
Because it reveals important features of the concept of education that are not easily
contestable, Wilson’s definition identifies in a succinct way helpful parameters within
which questions that are properly educational might pertinently and profitably be
addressed. There may of course be additional features to attend to; features associ-
ated with the fact that education is a practice and therefore invariably embedded in
one or other historical context. Insofar as education as a field of study—whether
approached in philosophical, sociological or other mode – fails to attend to the kinds
of features he has highlighted, Wilson would hold that the field itself is ill-served by
its scholars. Though this is a rebuke to an ‘anything goes’ mentality, it should not be
a controversial point to say that his reminder here is a salutary one.
We have noted earlier the four criteria that Wilson has sketched for the philosophy
of education as a coherent and worthwhile enterprise: (1) that it can properly (rather
than misleadingly) be called philosophy of education; (2) that it is not already identi-
fied under some other title; (3) that it is a sui generis activity; (4) that it has something
valuable to offer to those involved in educational practice. We have also explored in
summary Wilson’s constructive proposals to advance a form of philosophical thinking
that would meet these criteria. We have seen that in pursuit of this end he rules out
philosophy as a personal creed and philosophy as an empirical discipline, advocating
instead a combination of philosophy as a critical discipline for the appraisal of value
judgements and philosophy as a logical discipline. At this point I want to suggest that,
although these moves mark a notable advance, there is something in them that also
places constraints on Wilson’s own best purposes. In particular I want to argue a case
for three related points: (a) that a ‘culture-free’ and ‘time-free’ understanding of
education, though apparently desirable as a corrective to bias, is probably unattain-
able, and in any case would miss much that is of inestimable importance; (b) that
some sense of personal conviction, but one that remains open to criticism and self-
criticism, remains crucial to anything called philosophy of education; (c) that
Wilson’s acknowledged attraction to an academic form of philosophy that he himself
calls ‘Oxbridge philosophy’ (1980, p. 42) hinders his twin efforts to establish the
philosophy of education as a sui generis discipline and to disclose education as a coher-
ent undertaking in its own right. I shall explore each of these briefly in this final
section of the article and, in doing so, try to recover some insights from what I have
called above the neglected legacy of Socrates.
Let us start with the issue of an understanding of education that seeks to be
‘culture-free’ and ‘time-free’. Because education is a human practice, as distinct from
a phenomenon or logical entity that can be neatly circumscribed, it is not something
that can be adequately understood if it is divorced from the historical contexts and
cultural circumstances in which it is carried on. This is not to subscribe to the view
that education is essentially a ‘contestable’ concept. Rather it is to say that a philo-
sophical understanding of education that seeks to be an adequate one (i.e. not lose
sight of education as a practice) will properly view education as something involving
an inherent tension; indeed an inescapable tension. This is a tension between ideals
of learning that seek to escape the hold of history and culture on the one hand and,
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on the other, attitudes and practices that are deeply embedded in tradition and
custom, or in inheritances of learning themselves. Perhaps the best example in the
Western world of learning of this active tension, and of how it can be made fruitful,
is that of Socrates. Recall that Socrates had an enormous respect (notably in Apology
and Crito, Plato, 1969) for what inheritances of learning had to address to human
understanding and sensibility. Coupled with that respect however were two features
that well illustrate the inherent tension to which I have just referred. The first of these
is his questioning disposition towards what such inheritances left unexplained. The
second is his critical questioning of those who sought to peddle ready-made answers
to what remained most thought-provoking and question-worthy in such inheritances.
Drawing these points together, to understand education as a discipline of thought
and of action is to understand something that is more an active human interplay than
a process; an interplay in which tensions between ‘tradition and the individual talent’,
as T. S. Eliot put it, remain central to the arena in which teachers must think and
work. Educational practice has ever been attended by powerful forces—whether insti-
tutionalised cultural and historical ones or more personal or spontaneous ones—that
would close off the interplay or divert it to ends other than educational ones. A lesson
that the philosophy of education might profitably learn from the example of Socrates
is how best to identify and cope with such forces, thereby affording to education at
least some measure of space in which it might properly enjoy an integrity of its own.
Let us turn now to the second issue, namely my claim that some sense of personal
conviction remains crucial to anything called philosophy of education. Wilson is
correct to point out that ‘philosophy as a personal creed’, though supplying a ratio-
nale of one kind or another for a teacher’s actions, does not supply the resources for
an objective critique of such actions. But any critique of action must itself spring from
some kind of conviction, as for instance does any ‘critique of ideology’. Unless it steps
outside of history moreover, and assumes something like a ‘God’s eye’ view of
humanity and its affairs, neither can such a critique be objective except in some degree
or other. There is something of an illusionary reassurance, therefore, in the weight
that Wilson is prepared to place on answers that ‘satisfy the criteria of reason’
(p. 284). For instance, a quick retort to Wilson here might be to ask: The criteria of
whose reason? This puts it perhaps too strongly, for it is no more a case of granting the
argument to a relativist stance than of claiming that humans can be in possession of
‘pure reason’. I am keen rather to point out that the criteria of human reason are only
as strong as the (often unacknowledged) presuppositions from which they spring. To
this one might add that such presuppositions are not something ‘merely subjective’
that can be set aside, but are a constitutive feature of human rationality itself. This
means that a form of argumentation that includes a self-critical standpoint towards
its own presuppositions is probably the most objective and most sustainable form of
argumentation of which human reason is capable.
To illustrate this point and its crucial significance for the philosophy of education,
let me draw again on Socrates. I would like to quote a memorable passage from his
defence of his life’s work to a jury of 501 fellow citizens. In this instance, however, I
would like the reader to substitute the word ‘reason’ wherever Socrates uses the word
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‘wisdom’. This does not disfigure anything, since for Socrates, reasoning featured
very largely in anything meriting the name wisdom. 
Real wisdom is the property of God and this oracle is his way of telling us that human
wisdom has little or no value. It seems to me that he is not referring literally to Socrates
but has merely taken my name as an example, as if he would say to us: ‘The wisest of you
is he who has realised, like Socrates, that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless’.
(Apology, 23a)
To respond to this by saying that one does not believe in God or in oracles is to miss
the critical point, just as it is to miss the irony in the remark that human wisdom (or
reason) is ‘really worthless’, coming as it does from one who spent most of his life
trying to nurture human reason to the best of its capabilities. The critical point
concerns the inherent limitations and partialities in human understanding itself.
Socrates proceeds to reveal cogently to the court his abiding conviction that a life
spent in trying to advance with others the cause of learning with the kind of intellec-
tual modesty that he and his associates have tried to practise, is the most worthy
kind of life for humans. From Socrates’ arguments here I would just wish to make
explicit, and to stress, two brief conclusions. First, the philosophy of education, in
the degree that it fails to embrace a conviction of this kind as a defining feature of its
own work, becomes in that degree enfeebled as philosophy of education. Second,
John Wilson’s writings and arguments over many decades reveal, despite his own
disclaimers, that in his case the philosophy of education involved not merely a logi-
cal discipline, but also a strong moral conviction that went beyond the confines of
formal logic; one that contained more than a few echoes of Socrates as thinker-cum-
educator.
Now to the third and final issue—my claim that Wilson’s intellectual leanings
toward a particularly academic form of philosophy tend to hinder his own best
purposes as a philosopher of education. From the references that have been made in
recent paragraphs to the example of Socrates, readers will gather that the practical
form of philosophy embodied in his life’s work provides a context that is more than a
little hospitable to Wilson’s concerns. Wilson indeed makes many references to
Socrates in his writings, and draws approvingly on Socratic insights. He does not,
however, see Socrates adequately as a practical philosopher in his own right. Neither
does the bulk of Western philosophical scholarship, chiefly for the reason of the
‘neglect’ I referred to in passing earlier. By this neglect I mean the manner in which
the most distinctive features of Socrates’ (non-metaphysical) thought became
eclipsed by the overwhelming influence on Western philosophy of the metaphysical
theories of his most distinguished student, Plato. There is of course an intriguing
irony in all of this, since it is to the dramatic early works of Plato that we owe our best
gleanings of the historical figure Socrates—works like Gorgias, Protagoras, Euthyphro,
Apology and Republic Bk1. And the irony is compounded if we take an educational
perspective here as distinct from that of philosophical scholarship. To put it concisely,
the enduring influence of Platonism on Western traditions of philosophy beclouded
what was most distinctive in the thought and practice of Socrates. To add to that, the
institutionalising of Platonist forms of thought in European centres of learning during
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the centuries-long era of Christendom helped to push towards oblivion a true appre-
ciation of a Socratic approach to educational thought and practice.
The reclamation of what is distinctive in the thought and work of Socrates,
especially in contrast to Plato, has been advancing in recent decades, most notably
perhaps through the writings of the late Gregory Vlastos (1991) and Alexander Neha-
mas (1998, 2000). I have been attempting to add my own efforts to this reclamation
where the philosophy of education is concerned (Hogan, 1995, Ch 1). But if the
philosophy of education is to be a sui generis activity—or as John Wilson puts it,
‘different in purpose and scope from other disciplines’—then it cannot find its most
fruitful sources in another ‘branch of philosophy’, especially one that is not given in
any major way to the concerns of practice, educational or otherwise. That is not to
say that ‘Oxbridge’ philosophy has nothing to say to the study of education. Wilson’s
own work has shown that it has, but a critical study of his arguments also reveals some
of its more important limitations. In my own engagement with these arguments I have
been interested not in any adversarial pursuit, but in trying to identify such limitations
so as to enable educational thought and action to get beyond them. In short, I have
been trying to outline at closer range the important landscape into which Wilson’s
enquiries have boldly sought to bring an educational thinking that is worthy of the
name.
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